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Abstract 
Steganography in streaming media differs from steganography in images or audio files because of 
the continuous embedding process and the necessary synchronization of sender and receiver due to 
packet loss in streaming media. The conventional theoretical model for image steganography is 
not appropriate for explaining the security scenarios for streaming media based stegosystems. In 
this paper, we propose a new information-theoretical model with two pseudo-random sequences 
imitating the continuous embedding and synchronization characteristics of streaming media based 
stegosystems. We also discuss the statistical properties of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) 
speech streams through theoretical analysis and experimental testing. The experimental results 
show the bit stream consisting of fixed codebook parameters in speech frames is similar in 
statistical characteristics to a white-noise sequence. The relative entropy between the VoIP speech 
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stream and the embedded secret message has been found to be zero. This leads us to conclude that 
the proposed streaming media based stegosystem is secure against statistical detection; in other 
words, the statistical measures cannot detect the existence of the secret message embedded in VoIP 
speech streams. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Modern steganography seeks to provide a covert communication channel between two 
communicating parties over a public network. With the upsurge of multimedia applications on the 
Internet, steganography in streaming media has become the focus of attention in the research field 
of information security. Multimedia objects have been found to be perfect candidates for use as 
cover objects. This is largely due to the fact that multimedia objects often have a highly redundant 
representation, which usually permits the addition of significantly large amount of stego-data by 
means of simple and subtle modifications that preserve the perceptual content of the underlying 
cover object. 
 
Shannon [1] first considered secrecy systems from the viewpoint of information theory, and 
identified three types of secret communications which he described as (i) concealment systems, (ii) 
privacy systems, and (iii) cryptographic systems. On concealment systems, i.e. steganography, 
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Shannon stated that such ‘systems are primarily a psychological problem’ and did not consider 
them further. 
 
Over the past ten years, several theoretical models for information hiding have been proposed; for 
example, the modelling of the security of steganographic systems suggested by Federrath et al [2]. 
Most models [3][4][5] focused on protecting the signal sources of communication for 
steganographic systems based on watermarking and fingerprinting. However, little effort has been 
made to model the secret communication process. 
 
Cachin examined secret communications from an information theoretical viewpoint. Cachin’s 
model [6] is the first to explicitly require that the stego-text distribution is indistinguishable from 
the cover-text distribution to an adversary. He assumed the adversary’s decision is based on 
statistical hypothesis testing as to whether the stego-object is drawn from the distribution of the 
cover object. He defined conditions for both a perfectly secure and an -secure stegosystems, 
under which the relative probability is either zero or negligible that the adversary cannot detect the 
existence of a covert communication. 
 
However, Cachin’s model is not suitable for the real-time covert communications over public 
networks where streaming media play an essential role due to the following reasons: 
 
a) Streaming media are dynamic data chunks of a series of IP packets, and secret messages can be 
embedded dynamically in some packets of media streams. Information hiding in streaming media 
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is a continuous embedding process, and it requires both the communicating parties to continually 
negotiate a series of encrypted-keys. As Cachin’s model assumes the stego object is encrypted by a 
simple key only, this conventional model does not meet the requirements of managing the series of 
keys. 
 
b) In a real-time covert communication, the synchronization between embedding and extracting is 
one of the major problems since packet loss occurs in streaming media. Large message data will 
likely be split across multiple packets. The message data split across multiple packets may arrive 
out of order, and one or more parts of the data split across multiple packets may not arrive at all. 
Therefore, the receiver should know where to extract the secret message from the cover object (i.e. 
which packets of media streams). But Cachin’s model falls short of synchronization mechanisms. 
 
c) Under the same constraints on security, a covert communication over streaming media needs 
larger embedding capacities and higher embedding rates in comparison with watermarking and 
fingerprinting. Cachin’s model failed to address how to enhance the embedding capacity for 
steganography in streaming media. 
 
In an attempt to overcome the problems of the above-mentioned model for image steganography, a 
new information theoretical model for steganography in streaming media is proposed in this study. 
Our proposed model introduces two pseudo-random sequences imitating the continuous 
embedding process and the necessary synchronization of sender and receiver due to packet loss in 
streaming media. For verification purposes, the proposed model was applied to a VoIP based 
  5
stegosystem, i.e. a real-time covert communication over the Internet. According to our model, 
streaming media based stegosystems have been proved to be -secure against a passive adversary. 
Experimental results for the passive adversary detection are also included in this paper. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 Cachin’s steganographic model is 
analysed. Section 3 describes our information theoretical model for steganography in streaming 
media. The application of the proposed model to VoIP based stegosystems and a number of 
statistical experiments on VoIP speech streams are detailed in Section 4. Section 5 presents passive 
adversary tests using  detection on VoIP based stegosystems. Finally, Section 6 concludes with a 
summary and directions for future work. 
 
  
2. Analysis of Cachin’s Model  
 
Following the approach of information theory, Cachin viewed the adversary’s task of 
distinguishing between a normal cover object (like an image) and a stego object containing a 
secret message as a problem of hypothesis testing. Cachin presented a mathematical description of 
the statistical distance between the cover object and the stego object from the viewpoint of the 
relative entropy [6]. He also defined conditions for both a perfectly secure and an -secure 
stegosystems. The stegosystem suggested by Cachin is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Cachin’s steganographic model 
 
Definition 1.  A stegosystem with covertext C and stegotext S (Figure 1) is called -secure 
against a passive adversary if the relative entropy )||( SC PPD . If  = 0, the stegosystem is 
regarded as perfectly secure. 
 
In the above definition, 


Qq S
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CSC P
PqPPPD log)()||( , where PC and PS are the probability 
distributions of the covertext C and the stegotext S, respectively, and Q is the space of possible 
measurements. Cachin considered Eve’s decision performance using the theory of hypothesis 
testing; the two errors that can be made in a decision are called a type I error and a type II error. If 
Eve fails to detect the stegotext S, she makes a type II error, and its probability is denoted by . 
The opposite error is that Eve decides that Alice sent stegotext although it was a legitimate cover 
text, and its probability is denoted by . And the binary relative entropy is given by 
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Lemma 1. Let 
0Q
P  and 
1Q
P be two plausible probability distributions over the space of possible 
measurements Q. For any function ,: Qf if )( 00 QfT   and )( 11 QfT  , then 
)||()||(
1010 QQTT
PPDPPD  . 
 
Theorem 1. In a stegosystem that is -secure against a passive adversary, the probability  that the 
adversary does not detect the presence of the hidden message and the probability  that the 
adversary falsely announces the presence of the hidden message satisfy  ),(d . In 
particular, if  = 0, then   2 . 
 
The above analysis can lead to the following inferences: 
a) Given a cover text C, Alice constructs the embedding function from a binary partition of the 
covertext space C’ such that both parts are assigned approximately the same probability under PC. 
In other words, the mathematical description of  is given by 
'
' '
min ( ) ( )C C
C C c C c C
P c P c
  
                      (1) 
The sender designs an embedding algorithm in such a way that the two parties of the stegosystem 
should have the same probability distribution. 
 
b) The physical meaning of  depicts the statistical distance between the cover object and the 
secret message. It has an intrinsic characteristic, which can be used to quantify the security of the 
stegosystem. A small value of  means the statistical distance is small and it is more difficult for 
the adversary to use a statistical method to detect the hidden secret message, the stegosystem is 
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then regarded as  secure. If  = 0 and  = 1, the adversary would never detect the secret message; 
in this case, the stegosystem can be called ‘perfectly secure’. 
 
 
3. Our Proposed Steganographic Model 
 
As stated in Introduction, Cachin’s stego-model is not applicable to streaming media based 
stegosystems. Streaming media are different from traditional cover objects, such as plaintext files, 
images in BMP or JPEG format, and audio files in WAV or MP3 format [7-10]. The former can be 
used for dynamically embedding secret messages in IP packets in a real-time manner, but the latter 
are static cover objects in which secret messages are embedded statically.   
 
Because of packet loss in streaming media based stegosystems, both the communicating parties 
need to periodically negotiate the private key so as to continuously transmit the secret message. 
However, Cachin’s model is not capable of addressing the continuous negotiation of the private 
key in the streaming media based stegosystems. In addition, Cachin’s model falls short of 
synchronization mechanisms, so that the receiver would not be able to identify what packets of 
streaming media contain part of or a secret message. 
 
To tackle the above problems, we propose a new theoretical model with two pseudo-random 
sequences for steganography in streaming media. One sequence is used as the private-key for 
encrypting a secret message; the other sequence is utilised to provide the necessary 
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synchronization of sender and receiver in streaming media. The proposed model is applicable to 
VoIP based stegosystems, and can then be used to analyse the security of the stegosystems. The 
details of the proposed model for steganography in streaming media are described below. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The proposed model for steganography in streaming media 
 
Assuming that Alice and Bob share two key sequences (set of variables), 0 1 2...A a a a and 
0 1 2...B b b b , respectively. The sequence A is an N-level M pseudo-random sequence with the 
period of (2n - 1); and in one period the “1” appearance probability is  = 2n-1 / (2n - 1). The 
sequence B is the shifting sequence of the sequence A. The sequence B is used as the encryption 
key while the sequence A is used to imitate the necessary synchronization of sender and receiver 
in covert communications. In other words, the sequence A is used to decide what packets of 
  10
streaming media are used for embedding secret messages. For the ith packet of a media-stream, for 
example, if ai = 0 Alice sends an ‘innocent’ packet C of the media-stream; if ai = 1, Alice then 
sends a stego packet S containing a secret message. Figure 2 is the schematic description of the 
proposed model for steganography in streaming media. 
 
The statistical distance between the cover object and the secret message can be expressed as 
 
 

0 0
)()(
Qq Qq
CC qPqP , QQ 0 , where PC is the probability distribution of the cover 
object, Q0 is a plausible space, and Q is the total space of possible measurements. Assuming Alice 
and Bob share ,2 QQ   let 


2
)(
Qq
C qP  , 23 QQQ  , where Q2 and Q3 are the 
observation spaces in relation to the stego object and the cover object respectively. It is often 
appropriate to model an information source as a stochastic process U. If the message sent in the ith 
packet is denoted by Ut, the stochastic process {Ut , t = 0,1,2, …} represents the stego-packet S or 
the cover-packet C. Then the total probability distribution of the secret message sent over the 
space Q is given by 
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where Q0 and Q1 are two plausible spaces of possible measurements, then 
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Following information theory, the relative entropy between the cover object and the stego object 
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for steganography in streaming media is given by  
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For a N-level M pseudo-random sequence,  = 1/2, equation (5) becomes 
)4()||( 22  UC PPD                                (6) 
The relative entropy D(PC || PU) does satisfy the condition defined in Definition 1, i.e. 
  )4()||( 22UC PPD                            (7) 
Therefore, equation (7) proves the proposed model for steganography in streaming media is - 
secure against a passive adversary. 
 
 
4. Application of Our Model to VoIP Based Stegosystems  
 
This section details the application of our proposed model to a VoIP based stegosystem, and the 
statistical properties of VoIP speech streams which were studied using theoretical analysis and 
experimental testing. 
 
4.1 Theoretical analysis of statistical characteristics of VoIP stegosystems 
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Suppose a VoIP stegosystem uses a speech codec of G.729a. A VoIP stream consists of a number of 
speech frames, which have a parameter called Fixed Codebook. A secret message can be 
embedded in some bits of the Fixed Codebook in speech frames. According to G.729a codec 
algorithms, Fixed Codebook describes the quantitative error between the raw speech and the 
predicted speech, and the end of the signal process model is a linear prediction error filter. The 
transfer function of the linear prediction error filter is defined as 


p
i
i
i zazA
1
1)( , where ai is 
the coefficient. The output e(n) of the error filter is the difference between the raw speech s(n) and 
the predicted speech )(ns

, given by 


 
p
i
i insansnsnsne
1
)()()()()(      (8) 
where )(ns

is denoted by a linear combination of overpass samples, s(n-1), s(n-2), …, s(n-p). 
Rearranging equation (8) yields 



p
i
i insanens
1
)()()(          (9) 
Replacing n with (n - j) equation (9) becomes 



p
i
i ijnsajnejns
1
)()()(              (10) 
 
Because the mean square error E[e2(n)] of the output e(n) has to be minimized, the partial 
derivative of the coefficient ia  can be obtained from E[e2(n)] by setting the partial derivative 
with respect to ja  to zero, i.e. 
  pj
a
neE
j

 1,0)(
2
. It has 
  0)]()([2)(2  jnsneEa neE j . Substituting equation (10) into this formula obtains: 
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Since e(n) is the linear combination of s(n), if P is big enough, equation (11) derives 



p
i
i ijnsnea
1
0)()(                                   (12) 
 
Equation (12) indicates that   1,0)()(  jjneneE  is tenable. So we can infer that the 
output of the error filter, e(n), is of linear independence, which means the predicted quantitative 
error has the characteristics of a white-noise sequence. In fact, the purpose of adjusting the filter 
coefficient, according to the principle of the minimum error variance, is to make the output e(n) to 
be a white-noise sequence. 
 
4.2 Experimental simulation of statistical characteristics of VoIP stegosystems 
 
Three statistical methods used for analysing data redundancy in this study are “0/1” probability, 
“0/1” jumping frequency and run-length [11]. 
 
1) “0/1” probability of speech streams 
 
The “0/1” probability method requires the calculations of “0” and “1” numbers appearing in a 
VoIP speech stream as well as their proportions. The proportions of “0/1” probabilities ought to be 
equal if all samples are independent [13]. 
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Table 1:  The “0/1” probabilities of Fixed Codebook parameters in G.729a speech samples 
 Sample1 Sample2 Sample3 Sample4 
“1” probability 0.503062 0.478601 0.511638 0.495734 
“0” probability 0.496938 0.521399 0.488362 0.504266 
 
Let N be the frame length of a speech stream. Assuming the speech stream Y is divided into L 
frames, Y1Y2Y3 … YL. The probability of ‘1’ appearing in the speech stream Y is given by 
1 1
1 ,
0 0
1 L N
p i j
i j
Y y
LN
 
 
                      (13) 
where yi,j is the jth (j = 1, 2, …, N) column value in the ith (i = 1, 2, …, L) frame. Table 1 lists the 
“0/1” probabilities of Fixed Codebook parameters calculated using equation (13) for four different 
G.729a speech samples. The statistical results indicate that Fixed Codebook parameters have 
similar “0” and “1” probabilities, which is in accord with the distributive characteristics of a 
pseudo-random sequence. 
 
2) The jumping frequency of “0/1” in speech streams 
 
The jumping frequency of “0/1” is the number of “0” and “1” switching in the same column of the 
neighbouring frames in a speech stream. Assuming an initialisation Y0,j = 0, then 
  


1
1
,1,
1 L
i
jiji yyL
jCZR . Figure 3 shows the jumping frequency of “0/1” distribution 
pattern with 80 bits in a frame. The results indicate the “0/1” jumping frequency of the Fixed 
Codebook in speech frames is high and close to 1. This is probably due to the randomicity of 
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Fixed Codebook. This phenomenon can also be demonstrated by the run-length of Fixed 
Codebook in speech streams, as detailed in the next section. 
 
 
Figure 3: The jumping frequency of “0/1” in a G.729a speech stream 
 
3) Run-length statistical method 
 
The run-length statistical method was used to calculate the run-length of continuous “0” or “1” 
appearing in a bit stream. Assuming the bit stream 321 ,, bbb  satisfies the following equation: 









1
1
1
1,,2,1,
RkRk
ikik
kk
bb
Ribb
bb
                (14) 
In other words, the run-length of the bit stream is equal to the number of bits from kb  to 1Rkb , 
where R denotes the run-length of the bit stream. Figure 4 shows the run-lengths of Fixed 
Codebook in four G.729a speech streams. The statistical results indicate that the run-lengths of all 
the four speech streams are very small. For example, up to 50% of the run-lengths of “1” equal 1. 
The run-lengths of “0” are quite similar to the run-lengths of “1” for all the used samples. These 
findings mean the experimental results are in agreement with the distributive characteristics of a 
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pseudo-random sequence. The results also prove the bit stream consisting of Fixed Codebook in 
G.729.a speech frames is similar to a white-noise sequence. 
 
4.3 -Secure against a passive adversary in VoIP based stegosystems  
 
The theoretical analysis and experimental simulation described above indicate that the linear 
prediction error filter can be regarded as a counter-approximate process [14], and also prove that 
the filter parameter A(z) can be adjusted to make the output e(n) analogous to a white-noise 
sequence. In addition, the statistical characteristics of the stego-objects containing secret messages 
are also similar to a white-noise sequence. According to the definition of  in equation (1), it is 
reasonable to infer that the packets of VoIP streams have the same statistical characteristics as the 
encrypted secret messages; that is, the relative entropy that represents the statistical distance 
between the speech stream and the secret message is close to zero. Therefore, VoIP based 
stegosystems are determined to be ‘perfectly secure’ against statistical detection providing the 
secret messages are encrypted before embedding. This proves our proposed steganographic model 
is appropriate for describing the security of streaming media based stegosystems. 
 
  17
 
 
Figure 4: The run-lengths of Fixed Codebook in speech streams 
 
 
5. Passive Adversary Test on VoIP Based Stegosystems 
 
In order to prove the correlations between subsequent packets in experimental simulation 
(Sections 4.2 & 4.3) could not be used to break the stegosystems, the  detection was used to 
further evaluate the security of VoIP based stegosystems in this study. Comparisons in probability 
distributions between the predictions from the proposed theoretical model and the experimental 
data were used to decide whether the cover objects (VoIP streams) contain a secret message. 
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Table 2: Estimated confidence levels for continuous embedding experiments 
Continuous 
embedding 
Data1 Data2 Data3 Data4 Data5 Data6 Data7 Data8 Data9 Data10
Pseudo-random 
sequence 
3.070 3.333 3.626 3.258 3.674 3.248 3.551 3.712 3.094 3.286 
Natural 
number 
7.129 6.928 6.935 7.183 7.047 7.531 6.989 6.827 6.582 7.016 
 
A series of experiments were conducted by employing STEGOTALK software to generate VoIP 
based stegosystems. Figure 5 illustrates the experimental environment in which two PCs with 
STEGOTALK being installed were deployed over the China Education and Research Network 
(CERNET). Alice and Bob used STEGOTALK to communicate covertly over the CERNET, and 
Mary, acting as a passive adversary, monitored the covert communication between Alice and Bob. 
 
The STEGOTALK software utilises G.729a codec to encode the speech first and then uses Session 
Initiation Protocol (SIP) to initiate a Session, which is transmitted over VoIP. The principle of the 
software is referred to Figure 2 in which steganography in streaming media is carried out by 
employing two sets of sequences – encrypted keys and synchronization controls. 
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Figure 5: The experimental environment in which Alice and Bob using STEGOTALK 
 
The speech streams of G.729a codec were used as cover objects. Ten test samples (Data1, 
Data2, …, Data10) were the speech streams with secret messages embedded in a continuous 
manner, i.e. every packet of the speech streams contained a secret message. Pseudo-random 
sequences and natural numbers were used as secret messages, respectively. The  detection was 
used to estimate the embedding confidence level, and the results are listed in Table 2. 
 
For comparison purposes, other specially designed experiments were conducted (Table 3). A key 
sequence was used in these experiments to ensure only part of VoIP packets were used to embed 
secret messages, in contrast with the previous experimental group (Table 2) that the embedding 
rates were 100%. The above-mentioned N-level M pseudo-random sequences were used to choose 
what VoIP packets to be used for embedding secret messages. In the experiments, half the packets 
were used to embed secret messages; that is, the percentage of the packets containing secret 
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messages is 50%. Similar to the first experimental group (Table 2), pseudo-random sequences and 
natural numbers were employed as secret messages, and the adversary employed  detection to 
discover the secret messages. Table 3 are the detection results for the 50% embedding 
experiments. 
 
Table 3: Estimated confidence levels for 50% embedding experiments 
50% embedding Data1 Data2 Data3 Data4 Data5 Data6 Data7 Data8 Data9 Data10
Pseudo-random 
sequence 
3.216 2.950 2.847 2.784 3.018 2.918 3.174 3.658 2.958 3.085 
Natural number 6.037 6.253 6.721 7.012 7.115 6.932 6.358 6.712 6.256 6.159 
 
A detailed analysis of the results obtained from the two experimental groups (Tables 2 and 3) 
reveals that there are no much differences in the estimated confidence levels between the 
continuous embedding experiments (every packet contains a secret message) and the 50% 
embedding experiments (only half the packets have secret messages embedded). This means it is 
unlikely to use the statistical measures to detect the existence of the secret messages embedded in 
the G.729a speech streams. In other words, VoIP based stegosystems are perfectly secure against 
statistical detection as long as the encrypted secret messages are embedded in the Fixed Codebook 
of G.729a speech streams. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
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Steganography in streaming media is different from steganography in images / audio files because 
of the real-time embedding and synchronization characteristics of streaming media based 
stegosystems. The proposed information theoretical model with two pseudo-random sequences is 
applicable to streaming media based stegosystems. The performance of the proposed model has 
been evaluated by applying the model to a VoIP based stegosystem to analyse its security. 
Experimental results indicate the statistical characteristics of the bit stream consisting of fixed 
codebook parameters in speech frames are analogous to a white-noise sequence. The relative 
entropy between the speech stream and the encrypted secret message is found to be zero. This 
leads to the conclusion that it is unlikely to use the statistical measures to detect the existence of 
the secret messages hidden in speech streams provided that the messages are embedded in the 
Fixed Codebook in G.729a speech frames. Building a mathematical model to compute the 
embedding capacity for streaming media based stegosystems is the subject of future work.   
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